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Abstract. Online auctions are a viable alternative to conventional posted price 
mechanisms. Agrawal, Wang, and Ye [1] have proposed two primal-dual 
algorithms for revenue-maximizing multi-item allocation tasks. Although 
promising in terms of theoretical properties and competitive ratios, there is a 
lack of evidence regarding the real-world practicability of these mechanisms, 
for instance referring to online auction-based tickets sales. In this paper, we 
conduct an experimental study on both the One-Time Learning Algorithm 
(OLA) and the Dynamic Learning Algorithm (DLA) based on synthetic data, 
revealing the remarkable aptitude of the latter for non-trivial online auctions. 
Being robust to most input variations, the inherent dynamic update of dual 
thresholds achieves a superior balance with respect to the trade-off between 
objective function values and runtimes. We address critical sensitivities 
quantitatively and draft several small extensions by incorporating input 
distribution knowledge.  
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1 Introduction 
Online auctions and auction-type mechanisms become increasingly popular for 
revenue-maximizing allocations of scarce resources. While display ad auctions and 
sponsored search are always based on bidders revealing their willingness-to-pay prior 
to the actual allocation, many B2C business models still rely on conventional posted 
prices. For instance, ticket sales for cultural events or sports competitions are often 
conducted with a fixed-price policy, occasionally replaced by concepts of revenue 
management or dynamic pricing. In this case, however, sellers have little knowledge 
on the willingness-to-pay or consumer surplus of the bidders, potentially preventing 
higher revenues. In contrast, auction-type allocations in an online fashion can enable a 
better absorption of buying power and hence a more efficient allocation. Recently, in 
the aviation or hotel industry it can be observed that companies experiment with their 
established pricing models by gradually substituting conventional posted price 
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mechanisms with online open auctions. Such auctions might also be of particular 
interest for ticket sales in order to reduce black market activity. Aside from the online 
arrival of bidders, however, ticket allocation problems often exhibit additional 
complexity as a result of excess demand, heterogeneous willingness-to-pay and short 
processing times, calling for performant and fast decision-making algorithms.  
We examine a notable contribution by [1] in the context of online resource 
allocation. Based on a primal-dual approach, the authors state theoretical properties 
and postulate a broad applicability of their two algorithms vis-a-vis auction-type 
allocations. As with many primal-dual frameworks, however, little is known about the 
implementation, real-world feasibility or practical challenges of these mechanisms. 
This paper seeks to examine this gap between theory and practicability by 
assessing the empirical applicability of both the One-Time Learning Algorithm 
(OLA), which calculates a single set of dual threshold prices, and the Dynamic 
Learning Algorithm (DLA), which continuously updates dual prices at geometric time 
intervals. Optimizing the revenue against a stationary bidding process, we perform 
numerical experiments on both algorithms based on synthetic data and compare the 
runtimes and objective values to three benchmarks. Furthermore, we examine 
reasonable parameter combinations and investigate the algorithms’ sensitivity with 
respect to their input parameters. We find a strong trade-off between outcome quality 
and runtime, whereas the DLA produces superior outputs while maintaining moderate 
runtimes for almost all cases. Our experiments provide evidence that the DLA is 
especially suited for complex allocation tasks with resource scarcity, heterogeneous 
bidders and limited ex-ante knowledge. Moreover, addressing the most critical 
sensitivity, we suggest several extensions utilizing priorly known input distribution 
information and thus improving the practical applicability for online auctions.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 begins by reviewing 
recent contributions in the online resource allocation literature. We also explain the 
algorithms of [1] in more detail. We present our implementation and experimental 
design in section 3.1. Section 3.2 provides the experimental observations and states 
key results. We discuss our findings with respect to extensions and put emphasis on 
enhancing the practicability. Section 4 concludes and suggests further research. 
2 Review of Literature and Research 
Optimizing the allocation of given resources with respect to revenue or social welfare 
is a core element of a variety of scientific contributions. A popular approach is to 
actively control the availability of resources, often referred to as revenue management 
[16]. Closely related is the concept of dynamic pricing, in particular dynamically 
adjusting posted prices for the purpose of revenue maximization. Comprehensive 
literature overviews for value-based pricing techniques are, for instance, provided by 
[12] or [16]. Although these concepts ultimately aim at exploiting differences in 
customer willingness-to-pay, one key drawback of such techniques is the failure to 
explicitly record willingness-to-pay and hereby enhance the producer surplus.  
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Another domain of resource allocation is auction theory. While other objectives 
such as efficiency or states of equilibria can certainly exist, revenue maximizations 
might also be pursued through auctions. Since bidders reveal their true willingness-to-
pay in incentive-compatible mechanisms, sellers might be able to absorb a larger 
proportion of the consumer surplus, thus increasing revenue. Traditional auction 
theory usually refers to a single point in time with comprehensive knowledge of 
demand and supply. However, an increasing number of digital markets are dynamic, 
meaning that bidders reveal their willingness-to-pay sequentially, requiring an 
immediate allocation decision by the auctioneer. The growing field of online auctions 
focuses – amongst others – on the algorithmic design for this class of problems. 
Examples include, for instance, [2], [14], and [17]. [13] specifically address the case 
of online ticket sales and design a fully stochastic and dynamic algorithm in order to 
compute an optimal online auction mechanism. [9] demonstrate that posted price 
mechanisms can indeed match competitive ratios of combinatorial auction principles, 
provided that stochastic information of the bidders’ valuations is available. 
Among a variety of algorithmic frameworks, one popular approach for online 
allocations is the utilization of dual threshold prices. Reasons for this include, for 
instance, a wide field of application, simple interpretability as well as the ease of 
implementation. In essence, this concept makes use of shadow prices of an ex-ante 
linear program as weights for subsequent decision-making. An incoming request can 
thus only be accepted if the weighted resource consumption is exceeded by the 
communicated willingness-to-pay. For instance, [8] investigate the AdWords problem 
within a similar framework as [1]. Under a random permutation assumption with 
known number of bidders and a specific right-hand side condition, they retrieve a 
(1 − ε)-competitive algorithm. In a similar manner, but assuming an i.i.d. input with 
unknown and changing distributions, [7] develops dual-based resource allocation 
algorithms for stochastic AdWords problems. In a series of interrelated contributions, 
[3-5] use primal-dual approaches to match and prove several competitive ratios for 
various kinds of online problems, for example ad-auctions. Other examples using dual 
approaches include [10-11] for display ads or [6] in a Bayesian auction setting.  
However, some contributions, for example those relating to the AdWords problem, 
do not permit multidimensional demand vectors, in particular the possibility to 
request several resources simultaneously, and are thus not directly applicable to ticket 
sales or similar B2C businesses. In contrast, the algorithms proposed by [1] explicitly 
refer to classical multi-item revenue maximization problems. The authors also 
demonstrate a superiority with respect to the theoretical competitive ratios compared 
to related online auction frameworks.  
In order to allocate resources in an online auction fashion [1] use online linear 
programming, where the constraint matrix and corresponding objective function 
coefficients are revealed column by column over time. The linear program is 
calculated based on the input received so far and without any information about future 
requests. However, all subsequent decisions are based on this solution. More 
precisely, consider the following linear program: 
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  maximize	∑ ./0/1/23  
  subject	to	 ∑ ;</0/ ≤ ><1/23    ? = 1, … ,C        (1) 
  0/ ∈ [0,1]    H = 1,… , I, 
where	C denotes the number of capacity constraints and I represents the number of 
columns. While ;</  stands for the requested items by bidder H regarding resource ? 
with capacity	><, the term ./  denotes the willingness-to-pay for the total package. In 
an online auction the coefficients (./ , JK) are revealed consecutively over time. The 
contribution of [1] is to compute the dual solution of a partial linear program and use 
it as a decision rule for future incoming bidders. The key idea is to set threshold prices 
L = (M<)<23,..,O for each resource ? equal to the dual prices of a linear program that is 
solved after a fraction of P	є	(0,1) columns are revealed. Subsequent incoming bids 
(./ , JK) will be compared to the current threshold prices	L. A bid will only be 
accepted if ./  exceeds LRJK and if no resource constraint is violated, meaning the 
problem remains feasible with	0/ = 1.  
 
OLA: DLA:                                                                  (2) 
maximize ∑ ./0/S/23  maximize ∑ ./0/T/23                                            
s. t. ∑ ;</0/ ≤ (1 − P) S1 ><S/23   s. t. ∑ ;</0/ ≤ (1 − ℎT) T1 ><T/23 													? = 1, … ,C 0/ ∈ [0,1] 0/ ∈ [0,1]   																																															H = 1, … , V 
 
[1] present two algorithms: the so called One-Time Learning Algorithm (OLA) and 
the Dynamic Learning Algorithm (DLA). The respective partial linear programs for 
retrieving the sets of dual prices are denoted above. The OLA learns a single 
threshold price vector at time	V = 	PI, applicable to all following bids. All incoming 
requests until V	are only used to calculate the threshold prices and will always be 
rejected. Assuming that I is known and (./ , JK) arrive in random order, [1] show that 
the OLA exhibits (1 − 6P)-competitiveness against the ex-post optimum (XYZ) under 
the right-hand side condition	[ = min< >< ≥	
^OT_`(1/b)
bc .  
The DLA updates dual prices in geometric intervals at	PI, 2PI, 4PI, 8PI, …, in 
particular for each g = ⌈2iPI⌉ with the largest integer k such that g < H. The right-
hand side of the partial linear programs is modified by a factor	ℎT = Pm1T  . The DLA 
is 1 − X(P) competitive given a milder condition	[ = min< >< ≥	
OT_`(1/b)
bn .  
Note that both algorithms are distribution-free. However, [1] need ex-ante 
knowledge about the size of I in order to calculate the learning fractions of the 
respective algorithm. Furthermore, [1] assume that the bids (./ , JK) arrive in random 
order. The latter assumption seems reasonable from a practical perspective, as the 
order of columns usually appears to be independent of the columns’ content. 
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3 Experimental Analysis 
3.1 Experimental Design 
The main contribution of [1] is the introduction and (theoretical) analysis of these two 
algorithms for solving online allocation problems. However, they do not feature any 
specific implementation or application. This paper intends to examine the implied 
allocation mechanism from a practical perspective and to analyze sensitivities. 
For this purpose, the algorithms are implemented and systematically tested in 
numerical experiments. In particular, all input parameters are varied in an orderly 
fashion to isolate important influencing factors on the algorithms' outcome and 
runtime. The treatment variables include the number of resources	C, resource 
capacities	>, initial learning fraction P	as well as number of bidders	I. Moreover, 
building on the distribution-free property of the algorithms, we examine the 
robustness with respect to different stationary input distributions or distribution 
parameters regarding the willingness-to-pay ./  and the item requests	;</ .  
Table 1. Parameters and Treatment Variables 
 Description Values and Distributions 
Parameters Simulations per Configuration 10 
 Permutations per Simulation 100 
 max	(;</) 5 
 ;3/ , ;p/ , ;q/ r(0.4, 0.3),r(0.5, 0.6),r(0.6, 0.9) 
 .3/,.p/ ,.q/ r(100,30),r(75, 20),r(50,10) 
   
Treatment  Resources C {1;2; x; 5; 10} 
Variables Capacity > {50;100; z{{;300;400; 500;600; 700; 
800;900; 1,000} 
 Fraction P {0.001;{. {|;0.02;0.03;0.04;0.05;0.075; 
0.1;0.125;0.15;0.2; 0.25} 
 Bidders I {200;400; 600;800;|, {{{;1,200;1,400; 
1,600;1,800;2,000;5,000;10,000} 
 
The treatments are analyzed with respect to runtimes as well as objective function 
values, i.e. the revenue generated from the allocation in percent of the ex-post 
optimum. We define a baseline treatment which serves as a reference point for the 
subsequent ceteris paribus variation of treatment variables. The values and ranges for 
each parameter and variable are summarized in Table 1. The respective baseline 
configuration (C = 3, > = 200, P = 0.01, I = 1,000) is highlighted in bold 
characters. All resources are assumed to have an identical capacity	>< = >. The 
parameter ;</  is required to be an integer value between zero and a pre-specified 
upper limit. In order to map distinct resource classes, the parameter ;</  follows a 
normal distribution with stepwise mean-variance-tuples. Similarly, the willingness-to-
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pay decrease over the different resources and are summed up to an aggregate	./ . 
Every bidder H is obligated to request at least one item. 
Each treatment variable is considered in an isolated fashion. Under the ceteris 
paribus assumption, each input parameter is varied according to Table 1 using the 
baseline configuration as a starting point. Hence, our experimental design comprises 
40 treatment combinations. For each configuration, 10 instances are created. Since 
[1] consider expected values over all permutations, each instance consists of 100 sub-
instances, representing different permutations of the set of bidders.  
Regarding the runtime evaluation, it should be noted that single permutations 
might be subject to noise distorting the measured runtimes. However, since averages 
are taken over a multitude of permutations, valid statements on general trends are 
ensured. Furthermore, we only intend to examine diverging runtime magnitudes and 
to identify common patterns. In order to explicitly exclude the possibility of invalid 
runtimes, we checked the results against larger problem instances. Essentially, we 
scaled the test configurations up by a factor of 100 (e.g.	> = 20,000, I = 100,000 
with 10 permutations and 5 simulations as the baseline treatment) and computed the 
respective ratios of runtimes. These ratios also took values of the up-scaling factor 
of	100, which we found to be consistent with our previous runtime analysis. Absolute 
runtimes should, however, always be handled with care according to [15].  
In order to evaluate the objective function values and runtimes of both the OLA 
and the DLA, several simple benchmarks have been implemented as alternative 
measures. The most simplistic mechanism would be to accept any incoming request, 
as long as no constraint is violated. This quick and easy allocation principle is referred 
to as Greedy Algorithm in our context. In contrast, a so-called Interval Learner 
updates dual prices at constant 10%-intervals with respect to the ex-ante known 
number of incoming bids	I. This benchmark is expected to always exhibit longer 
runtimes. The last benchmark, the Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) Learner, is based on 
the idea that it might be reasonable to update dual prices whenever the average over 
all bids per item changes by a certain magnitude, in our case by at least	5% in 
absolute terms. That is, if the pool of bidders appears to become more heterogeneous, 
different threshold prices might be deemed appropriate, calling for a re-calibration of 
dual prices. A fraction of	10% of the bids is used to calculate the initial dual prices. 
The simulations were implemented in Python 3.6. Linear programs were solved 
using the interface to Gurobi 8.0. All simulations were performed on an Intel Core i7 
7700K 4.20GHz quad-core machine with 32 GB of RAM. 
3.2 Results 
Starting with the baseline treatment, the well-known trade-off between 
approximation capabilities regarding the	XYZ	and average runtimes already becomes 
visible. The numerical results indicate that the DLA excels in terms of the objective 
function (93.68% of the	XYZ). Evidently, the frequent update of dual prices 
incorporated into the DLA generates considerably better objective function values as 
opposed to the simpler OLA (69.42%), at least given the input parameters at hand. 
Furthermore, in spite of several updating steps of dual prices, the DLA certainly 
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seems to be able to balance objective function output and runtime (126.47CV; 
OLA:	8.36CV) reasonably. In contrast, while the Greedy Algorithm 
(80.27%; 1.53CV) and the WTP Learner (86.25%; 97.31CV) are executed faster, 
they cannot provide comparable approximations of the XYZ	due to their naivety. 
Likewise, the Interval Learner may come closer to the DLA vis-à-vis the objective 
(88.96%), but requires significantly more runtime (405.35CV). The OLA only 
proves to be competitive for large problem instances. Most notably, its approximation 
ratio increases to 95.16% in the up-scaled control scenario, potentially because the 
number of bids PI used for learning the dual prices is bigger in absolute terms. 
Therefore, the calibrated thresholds might be more valid than in the small-scale case. 
Result 1. The DLA provides a superior balance between objective function values and 
average runtimes. While several re-calibrations of dual thresholds enable good 
approximations of the ex-post optimum, the geometric updating intervals shift the 
majority of computational intensity toward small-scale optimization problems. 
Under the ceteris paribus condition, a variation of the total number of resources C, 
each having a capacity of 200 units, does not significantly affect the approximation 
performance of either the OLA or the DLA, as can be seen in Table 2. Employing a 
very little or a very large number of resources does not deteriorate the outcome 
substantially, potentially since each added resource inevitably comes along with new 
demand, as guaranteed by the simulation specifics. The performance of the Greedy 
Algorithm, however, constantly drops with an increasing number of resources. Table 
2 also reports linear regression slope coefficients and adjusted ~² figures for the 
objective function and the runtime. Regarding these coefficients, note that the 
dependent variables are denoted in percent and milliseconds (CV), respectively. 
Moreover, a significance level of 1% is chosen. The negative linear objective 
function sensitivity of the Greedy Algorithm may be ascribed to growing 
heterogeneity among bidders as a result of more resources and hence more scope of 
simulation. Since more deliberate decisions are necessary for a diverse pool of 
bidders, the naïve Greedy Algorithm cannot sustain its approximation ratio. The 
runtimes for almost all mechanisms increase significantly and in a linear fashion once 
new resources are added.  
Because an increase in the number of resources goes hand in hand with newly 
generated demand, resource scarcity or abundance can better be reflected by changing 
the available capacities	>. As displayed in Table 3, the Greedy Algorithm, the DLA, 
and the OLA ultimately converge to the XYZ in terms of the objective function value 
when resources are excessively available. In particular, a 100%-approximation of the 
Greedy Algorithm indicates that all incoming bidders can be served. In this case, 
shadow prices may be close to zero and the other mechanisms exhibit a gap to the 
XYZ	mainly due to the initial calibration period, where all requests are rejected. When 
resources are scarce, however, the algorithms show significant discrepancies. As 
items need to be assigned with consideration, simple allocation mechanisms, as 
implied by the OLA or the Greedy Algorithm, produce below average results. The 
OLA, however, exhibits the steepest linear growth with increasing resource capacity. 
In contrast, the DLA already performs very well for limited availabilities. It also 
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exhibits a slightly quadratic relationship, i.e. performing a quadratic regression 
increases the	~Äp	from 86.45% in the linear case to 96.49% with the quadratic 
regression coefficient being statistically significant at the 1% level. That is, the DLA 
dominates all other benchmarks as long as resources are exposed to scarcity to some 
extent. It also exceeds the WTP Learner and the Interval Learner, where the first 
10% of the bidders will always be rejected. Changing > does not significantly affect 
the average runtimes aside from the OLA and the Greedy Algorithm. That is, if more 
resource capacities are available, more bidders can be served, leading to a consistent 
upward trend in runtime, albeit on a small level. For the other mechanisms, this effect 
does not become visible, as it is only a tiny proportion of the total runtime.  
The fraction P represents an interesting lever for training-based algorithms, 
determining the number of bids initially required for calibrating the thresholds. As can 
be seen in Table 4, the three benchmarks exhibit zero sensitivity, as they do not make 
use of this parameter. In terms of the objective function value, the DLA shows the 
greatest dependence with respect to	P. Generally speaking, the smaller this fraction is 
chosen, the more learning instances are executed by the algorithm, enabling a better 
approximation of the XYZ. For large P, the OLA produces better results than the 
dynamic mechanism, indicating that the DLA is considerably restricted by the 
modifying right-hand side factor postulated by [1], artificially increasing the dual 
prices at each re-calibration for too large fractions. At the same time, unlike the DLA 
exhibiting a linearly decreasing behavior, the OLA produces its best results for a 
medium	P = 0.05. Since it only learns dual prices at a single time, a very small 
fraction of the sample will not be representative enough and thus result in a poor or 
incalculable performance. Therefore, in order to produce a proper outcome, a certain 
minimum share of bids needs to constitute the training set. The OLA thus exhibits a 
significant quadratic relationship with an ~Äp of	85.69%. Furthermore, the tests reveal 
linearly increasing OLA runtimes, since the single optimization problems will 
encompass more elements with increasing	P. As evident from the numerical results, 
the shape of the DLA runtime function is rather serrated. Holding the total number of 
required optimization steps constant, the runtime would increase with growing P for 
the same reasons as the OLA. However, once P exceeds some threshold, one former 
optimization step is not feasible anymore, thereby reducing the total number of dual 
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Changing the number of stationary bidders ! competing for the fixed resource 
capacities, the DLA once again proves to be robust. This can be seen in Table 5. 
While it becomes increasingly difficult to select the ex-post optimal requests from a 
larger set of bidders, the drop in performance is not as significant as with other 
benchmarks. The Greedy Algorithm, for instance, cannot maintain its approximation 
ratio. The WTP Learner and the Interval Learner remain robust to a certain extent, yet 
never reaching the performance of the DLA. The OLA, in turn, is more sensitive 
towards changes in	!. With a growing number of requests, a single learning step is not 
sufficient due to the multitude of bidders arriving subsequent to the calibration. The 
average runtimes of all algorithms naturally increase with problem size. The 
functional relationship concerning the runtimes is linear for all mechanisms.  
We validated the observations of these ceteris paribus analyses with a multivariate 
parameter grid and were not able to detect major deviations. The results above might, 
however, also be contingent upon the distribution assumptions. In general, there are 
six levers to be tested with respect to the stationary input processes: mean and 
standard deviation of the willingness-to-pay #$  and of the requests	%&$ , given a 
normality assumption, as well as the underlying distributions of the simulated 
parameters themselves. As pointed out by [1], the DLA stands out due to its 
distribution-free property and thus robustness to all tuning parameters. Conversely, 
the Greedy Algorithm benefits from homogeneous pools of bidders, exhibiting major 
improvements for decreasing standard deviations of	#$ . It is also most sensitive to 
changes of the underlying distributions of #$ 	and	%&$ . The normality assumption 
appears to be most suitable for achieving little runtimes. If the distribution parameters 
fluctuate within a simulation run, the DLAs performance deteriorates, yet is still 
competitive to the benchmarks. 
Result 2. The DLA proves to be robust regarding changes of most input parameters. 
Its capability to produce near-optimal objective function values remains widely 
unaffected by changes in the number of resources, available resource capacities, 
number of bidders, or distribution assumptions. The DLA thus seems to be applicable 
to any kind of online auction configuration with a revenue maximization objective.  
Result 3. The average runtimes of the DLA depend linearly on the number of 
resources and bidders. They are stable with respect to resource capacities. These 
statements also apply to the OLA and more naïve benchmarks.  
Result 4. The initial learning fraction ' represents the most critical sensitivity for the 
DLA. Small fractions are necessary in terms of the objective function value, but come 
at the cost of more computing time. The indispensable refusal of the first '! bidders is 
a key drawback with respect to the practical applicability of the DLA. 
Given these experimental results, several interesting inferences can be drawn with 
respect to the practical applicability of the DLA. In terms of the approximation of 
the	()*, the findings above indicate that large capacities	+, small fractions	', 
reasonable numbers of resources	,, and few bidders ! favor the DLA. The positive 
discrepancy towards other mechanisms, however, seems to increase for smaller + and 
larger	!, i.e. conditions of resource scarcity and excess demand. Customer 
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heterogeneity, implemented through larger standard deviations for	#$ , also contributes 
to the superiority of this mechanism. In order to validate these statements, a modified 
baseline treatment is defined with the main purpose of making the DLA the most 
dominant algorithm. Here, excess demand (! = 2,000) together with a little learning 
fraction (' = 0.001) and more heterogeneous bidders (3456 = (60,40,20)	∀<) are 
selected, while all other input figures remain identical to the initial baseline treatment. 
In this configuration, the DLA distinctly outperforms all other benchmarks with a 
94.60%-approximation of the		()*. The Interval Learner follows with a ratio 
of		89.10%, but with more than thrice the runtime of the DLA. While the WTP 
Learner reaches	86.42%, the Greedy Algorithm and the OLA only produce 64.56% 
and	64.51%, respectively. Hence, the DLA excels in terms of ()*-approximation 
when the allocation is complex, e.g. if resources are scarce and bidders 
heterogeneous, and thus complies well with the nature of the generic online tickets 
sales problem. The average runtimes do not differ from our initial findings. 
Result 5. The DLA is especially suited for non-trivial online auction problems, in 
particular for scenarios with resource scarcity and excess demand by heterogeneous 
bidders. Its degree of optimality is highly contingent upon the choice of the initial 
learning fraction	'. Subject to these limitations, the exemplary case of online ticket 
sales appears to be a viable and expedient area of application.  
The key drawback of the DLA seems to be the unconditional refusal of the first '! 
bidders, as this fraction is required to learn the first set of threshold prices. Especially 
for large	', it might be advantageous to define initial threshold prices to not lose 
revenue from the learning fraction. Moreover, the right-hand side modifier introduced 
by [1] artificially increases the dual prices, leading to overly restrictive thresholds for 
very large	'. Early-arriving bidders might also feel discriminated due to their arbitrary 
rejection. Since limited computing power or other conceivable reasons might prohibit 
the employment of sufficiently small learning fractions, this downside needs to be 
addressed in order to improve the applicability of the DLA for practical use cases, for 
instance for online auction-based ticket sales.  
As explained by [1], the DLA is explicitly designed as a distribution-free 
mechanism. This seems a particularly useful property if no knowledge is available 
about the incoming bidders. If the allocation is repeated regularly, however, it might 
be possible to infer estimators for distribution parameters from historical data. In this 
case, one should define some initial threshold prices based on the given information 
about the stationary input processes in order to mitigate the problems associated with 
a big '. Therefore, a deterministic linear program (LP), in particular replacing 
stochastic variables with their expected values, might be utilized for estimating 
meaningful thresholds. Dual prices can be accessed after solving the LP with expected 
willingness-to-pay and item requests. These shadow prices should be good references 
points for initial thresholds as they mirror expected values. Because all bidders are 
homogeneous in expectation, the LP can be solved by accepting all requests as long as 
no capacity restrictions are violated, just like the Greedy Algorithm. Since two 
resources will still be available when the third one is exhausted due to our assumption 
of stepwise demands, only one dual price will take a positive value in our setting. 
448
If the allocation problem has to be solved repeatedly with similar input features, it 
might also be reasonable to use an average over past dual prices as initial thresholds. 
In particular, when input distributions are known, several simulations can be executed 
prior to the actual allocation task. For each simulation run, the first set of dual prices 
after '! bidders is stored. The average over this set of shadow prices, in our case over 
10 simulations, can serve as initial thresholds for the actual allocation. 
Alternatively, more naïve initial threshold prices are the expected values of the 
known input distributions for the willingness-to-pay for each resource. All bids, 
exceeding these prices will be accepted as long as the problem remains feasible. 
Table 6. ()*-Approximations with Initial Thresholds 
' Baseline 
Treatment 




0.001 94.54% 94.41% 94.74% 94.44% 
0.01 93.67% 94.23% 94.84% 94.53% 
0.03 90.06% 92.86% 91.66% 93.49% 
0.05 86.32% 91.69% 91.10% 92.31% 
0.1  75.88% 87.33% 85.75% 89.44% 
0.15 65.16% 82.63% 77.95% 86.10% 
0.25 47.25% 74.93% 63.51% 80.85% 
The results of these different approaches for different ' are presented in Table 6. 
While the conventional DLA begins to rapidly deteriorate for	' ≥ 0.05, initial 
thresholds keep the performance on a higher level. In particular, using thresholds does 
not seem to be disadvantageous for any	'. Simulated dual prices appear to be too 
instance-specific, making it difficult to rely on a limited set of past thresholds for 
future allocations. Retrieving initial thresholds from solving a LP produces better 
approximations of the	()*. This especially applies to scenarios where large fractions 
' are chosen. Simply employing expected values of the distributions, however, further 
improves the approximation capabilities and should even be preferred to the more 
sophisticated alternatives. Again, it should be emphasized that this extension does not 
come along with any essential drawbacks. For small ' only few bidders are affected, 
whereas initial thresholds enable major gains for large fractions.  
The DLA together with well-defined initial thresholds can therefore be deemed 
appropriate for complex allocation tasks. It represents a viable alternative to online 
ticket sales or other multi-item B2C businesses, achieving superior approximations of 
the ()* while maintaining satisfactory runtimes at the same time. 
Result 6. Defining initial threshold prices by using available information on the input 
distributions mitigates the drawbacks of the DLA associated with very large learning 
fractions	'. Matching the thresholds with the expected willingness-to-pay until the 
first calibration of dual prices already aids in alleviating revenue loss. It can also 
improve on the perceived fairness in handling the bidders and thus enhances the 
practical applicability of the DLA substantially. 
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4 Conclusion 
Online auctions represent a promising alternative to conventional posted price 
mechanisms, potentially enabling a more effective exploitation of customer 
willingness-to-pay. Based on the notion of ticket sales, we conducted an experimental 
study on two seminal algorithms proposed by [1] and put special emphasis on the 
practicability of their underlying primal-dual framework. Both the OLA and the DLA 
were implemented for the purpose of simulation-based experimental testing, along 
with some intuitive benchmarks, ranging from a quick-and-easy Greedy Algorithm to 
a computationally intensive Interval Learner.  
There is a fundamental trade-off between the capability to approximate the ex-post 
optimal revenue and the average computational runtime. We ran extensive numerical 
experiments to discover dependencies and sensitivities of these opposing objectives. 
Through precisely defined re-calibrations of dual threshold prices, the DLA is able to 
approximate the ()* very well against a stationary process of bids. At the same time, 
it maintains reasonable runtimes, since dual updates occur more frequently at early 
stages of the allocation process. Our experiments illustrate that the DLA reacts robust 
to changes in many input parameters and proves to be extraordinarily dominant in 
situations of resource scarcity and excess demand. In this case, the decision rules 
implied by the DLA enable deliberate allocations through accurately determined 
thresholds.  
Addressing the problem of generally rejecting bids in the first learning phase, we 
drafted several extensions, making use of known distribution information and aiming 
at the definition of some initial thresholds that could be employed until the first 
ordinary calibration. While retrieving a set of dual prices from a deterministic linear 
model seems an elegant solution, simply using the expected values of the known input 
distributions as initial thresholds proves to be an easy and well-performing 
alternative. Initial threshold prices permit major enhancements with respect to the 
real-world applicability of the DLA. Together with its robustness regarding other 
treatment variables, the DLA can thus be viewed as an expedient alternative when it 
comes to online ticket sales or other revenue-maximizing multi-item allocation tasks. 
The basic idea underlying this research paper can be extended in various ways. An 
empirical validation with real-world data would, for instance, be desirable. Especially 
the context of online ticket sales seems to be a suitable use case. Furthermore, the 
algorithms have only been benchmarked with rather straightforward mechanisms. A 
more extensive experimental study with alternative sophisticated algorithms might 
provide useful insights into the applicability of different online auction mechanisms. 
Including risk considerations or non-monetary objectives would only be two possible 
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